Abstract. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for a social choice correspondence to be the one that selects the Pareto optimal alternatives.
Introduction
We characterize the social choice correspondence that selects the Pareto optimal alternatives. We use one condition, balancedness, introduced in and a second, stability (related to a condition in Campbell, Kelly, and Qi 2018) , as well as tops-in, the Pareto condition, and monotonicity. Though the collection of Pareto optimal states at any situation has been a central concern in welfare economics, there has been no work published we know of characterizing this mapping. Our main theorem shows necessary and sufficient conditions for the Pareto correspondence in the case of five or more alternatives. Three other results, using weaker conditions for the cases of two, three, or four alternatives are also included.
Framework
Let X with cardinality |X| = m ≥ 2 be the set of alternatives and let N = {1, 2, ..., n} with n ≥ 2 be the set of individuals. A (strong) ordering on X is a complete, asymmetric, transitive relation on X (so we exclude non-trivial individual indifference). The top-ranked element of an ordering r is denoted r[1], the next highest is denoted r[2], etc. The set of all strong orderings on X is L(X). A profile u is an element (u(1), u(2), ..., u(n)) of the Cartesian product L(X) N . If x ranks above y in u(j), we sometimes write x ≻ u j y. A social choice correspondence G is a map from the domain L(X) N to nonempty subsets of X. One example that will play a role here is the correspondence T that maps profile u to T (u), the union of the tops at u:
At profile u, alternative x is Pareto optimal if there does not exist an alternative y that Pareto dominates x. Thus G P (u) is the set of Pareto optimal alternatives at u.
Clearly, the Pareto correspondence satisfies the Pareto condition, and this is one of the conditions we use to characterize the Pareto correspondence. This may seem odd, but the condition of excluding dominated alternatives is very weak and is used in characterizing many standard social choice correspondences: dictatorship, Borda, plurality voting, Copeland rule, and union of the tops. This issue is addressed again in the conclusion.
The Pareto correspondence satisfies not only the Pareto condition, but also two conditions commonly used in social choice theory:
Anonymity: A social choice correspondence G satisfies anonymity if, for every permutation ρ on N , and every profile u,
Neutrality: Let θ be a permutation of X. If S = {x, y, ..., z} is a subset of X, we set θ(S) = {θ(x), θ(y), ..., θ(z)}. And if R is an ordering on X, we define θ(R) by (θ(x), θ(y)) ∈ θ(R) if and only if (x, y) ∈ R. Now we say a social choice correspondence G satisfies neutrality if, for every permutation θ of X, and every profile u,
Characterization with m = 2
We introduce a new property used in all the characterizations in this paper:
Of course T and the Pareto correspondence satisfy tops-in. Plurality rule and Borda's rule, for example, do not satisfy tops-in. Theorem 1. For m = 2 and n ≥ 2, let G : L(X) N → 2 X \{∅} be a social choice correspondence satisfying both of:
1. The Pareto condition; and 2. Tops-in; then G = G P , the Pareto correspondence.
Proof: Let G be a social choice correspondence satisfying the assumptions of the theorem. Case 1. Only one of the two alternatives, say x, is in T (u). Then by topsin, x ∈ G(u). By the Pareto condition, y / ∈ G(u). Therefore, G(u) = {x} = G P (u). Case 2. Otherwise both alternatives, x and y, are in T (u) and then, by tops-in, G(u) = {x, y} = G P (u).
We now present examples showing the need for each condition in Theorem 2: Example 1. A rule other than G P satisfying tops-in but not Pareto. G(u) = X for all profiles u.
Example 2. A rule other than G P satisfying Pareto but not tops-in. Let m = 2 and n = 3 and set G(u) equal to the set of plurality winners at u.
Characterization with m = 3
When m is larger than 2, the two properties of Theorem 1, Pareto and tops-in, are not sufficient to characterize the Pareto correspondence.
Example 3. For m ≥ 3, G(u) = T (u) is distinct from G P (u) but satisfies Pareto and tops-in.
Note that T (u) fails the following balancedness condition .
We say profile v is constructed from profile u by transposition pair (x, y) via individuals i and j if at u, x is immediately above y for i and y is immediately above x, and profile v is just the same as u except that alternatives x and y are transposed in both u(i) and u(j). A social choice correspondence G will be called balanced if, for all x, y, u, v, i, and j, whenever profile v is constructed from u by transposition pair (x, y) via individuals i and j, then G(v) = G(u).
The Pareto correspondence, Borda's rule, and the Copeland rule all satisfy balancedness, but T and plurality rule do not.
Theorem 2. For m = 3 and n ≥ 2, let G : L(X) N → 2 X \{∅} be a social choice correspondence satisfying all of:
1. The Pareto condition; 2. Tops-in; 3. Balancedness; then G = G P , the Pareto correspondence.
Proof : Assume G satisfies the three conditions. We need to show that if w is Pareto-optimal at u, then w ∈ G(u). Suppose instead there are profiles where Pareto optimals are not chosen. Among these profiles, let the height, h, be the highest rank in which an alternative w appears, with w Pareto optimal, but w / ∈ G(u). h = 1 is excluded by tops-in and h = 3 is excluded by the Pareto condition. So we consider h = 2. Suppose w is Pareto optimal, is in #1's second rank at u, is in no one's top rank at u, and w / ∈ G(u):
where x is at #1's top. Some individual, say #2, has w ≻ u 2 x since w is Pareto optimal. By balancedness, G(u ′ ) = G(u) where u ′ is obtained from u by transposition pair (x, w) for #1 and #2. So w / ∈ G(u ′ ). But that contradicts our choice of h since here at u ′ the height is 1 = h − 1.
To show the need for each condition in Theorem 2 (n = m = 3), we first observe that Example 3 exhibits a rule other than G P satisfying all conditions of Theorem 2 other than balancedness. Also, G(u) = X for all profiles u satisfies all conditions of Theorem 2 except Pareto.
Example 4. A rule other than G P satisfying all conditions of Theorem 2 except tops-in. Let m = n = 3 and let u * be a voter's paradox profile (where there are no transposition pairs). Define G(u
Characterization with m = 4
When m is larger than 3, the three properties of Theorem 2, Pareto, tops-in, and balancedness, are not sufficient to characterize the Pareto correspondence.
Example 5. Let X = {x, y, z, w} with n = 3. Consider the fixed profile u * :
1 2 3 x y z y w w z x x w z y which has no transposition pairs. Observe that G P (u * ) = {x, y, z, w}.
Now define social choice correspondence G as follows:
G satisfies Pareto, tops-in, and balancedness, but differs from G P at u * . So we need to add some new condition to those of Theorem 2 in order to characterize the Pareto correspondence for m > 3. What won't work is using anonymity and neutrality. Example 5 could be modified by constructing subdomain D consisting of all profiles obtained from the u * of that example by permuting either X or N or both. Then define
This G satisfies Pareto, tops-in, balancedness, anonymity, and neutrality, but differs from G P at every profile in D.
Monotonicity: A social choice correspondence G satisfies monotonicity if, for every x ∈ X, i ∈ N , and every profile u, if x ∈ G(u), and profile u ′ is constructed from u by raising x in i's ordering and leaving everything else unchanged, then
Raising x causes x to still be chosen, but does not allow new alternatives to be chosen that weren't chosen before. Pareto, Borda, plurality rule, and T all satisfy monotonicity.
Example 5, however, fails monotonicity in a significant way. If z ∈ G(u * ) is raised one rank in profile u * for #2, then G maps the resulting profile to {x, y, z, w} and a new alternative, w, has been introduced to the choice set. We now show there is no way to incorporate monotonicity without forcing G = G P .
Theorem 3. For m = 4 and n ≥ 2, let G : L(X) N → 2 X \{∅} be a social choice correspondence satisfying all of:
1. The Pareto condition; 2. Tops-in; 3. Balancedness; 4. Monotonicity; then G = G P , the Pareto correspondence.
Proof : Assume G satisfies the four conditions. We need to show that if w is Pareto-optimal at u, then w ∈ G(u). Suppose instead there are profiles where Pareto optimals are not chosen. Among these, let the height h be the highest rank in which some alternative w appears, with w Pareto optimal, but w / ∈ G(u).
Height h = 1 is excluded by tops-in and h = 4 is excluded by the Pareto condition. Two possibilities remain.
Case 1. h = 2. Suppose w is in #1's second rank at u:
where x is at #1's top. Some individual, say #2, has w ≻ u 2 x since w is Pareto optimal. Construct u ′ from u by raising x up to just below w for #2; w remains Pareto optimal. Now
where u ′′ is obtained from u ′ by transposition pair (x, w) via #1 and #2. So w / ∈ G(u ′′ ) but is still Pareto optimal. But that contradicts tops-in since, at u ′′ , #1 has w top-ranked.
Case 2. h = 3. Since w is Pareto optimal, it must be ranked higher than each of the other alternatives; without loss of generality, u is:
· · · w w w x y z
Take the alternative just above w for #1 to be say, y. Then construct u * from u by transposition pair (y, w) via # 1 and #2. By balancedness, w / ∈ G(u * ) where w is Pareto optimal and ranked second by #1 contrary to our assumption that h = 3.
For examples showing the need for each condition in Theorem 3 (with n = 3 and m = 4), we first observe that Example 5 exhibits a rule other than G P satisfying all conditions of Theorem 3 other than monotonicity. And G(u) = X for all profiles u is a rule other than G P satisfying all conditions of Theorem 3 except Pareto (Another: set G(u) = G P (u) except at profiles u where everyone has the same top and the same second-ranked alternative, at such profiles, G(u) is the set consisting of those two alternatives.) For the others:
Example 6. A rule other than G P satisfying all conditions of Theorem 3 except tops-in. Fix one alternative t, and then set G(u) = G P (u)\{t} unless G P (u) = {t}, in which case set G(u) = G P (u) = {t}.
Example 7. A rule other than G P satisfying all conditions of Theorem 3 except balancedness. G(u) = T (u).
Characterization with m ≥ 5
When m ≥ 5, the four properties of Theorem 3, Pareto, tops-in, balancedness, and monotonicity, are not sufficient to characterize the Pareto correspondence.
Example 8. Let X = {x, y, z, w, t}. Define social choice correspondence G as follows. First we identify a subdomain D of L(X) N which consists of just the two profiles u:
1
At these profiles in D, set G(u) = G(u * ) = {x, z}, the top-most alternatives (w is not chosen even though it is Pareto optimal). For all profiles v in L(X)
Clearly G satisfies the Pareto condition and tops-in. For balancedness, observe that there does not exist a transposition pair at either profile in D. Accordingly, if v is obtained from u by pairwise transposition, both u and v are in L(X) N \D where G(u) = G P (u) and G(v) = G P (v). Since G P satisfies balancedness, so does G.
All that remains is monotonicity. If v and u are both in L(X) N \D, and v arises from u by raising a chosen alternative x, then, because G = G P there, and G P satisfies monotonicity, we cannot have a violation of monotonicity by G. Neither profile in D can arise from the other by raising a chosen alternative. So, if G fails monotonicity, it has to be because raising a chosen
From D to L(X) N \D: Suppose v is constructed by raising x at u where G(u) = {x, z} (all other cases are dealt with by simple analogs of this argument). This must be for individual #2 and raising x means that x will now Pareto dominate w. Since y and t remain Pareto dominated, G(v) = G P (v) will be {x, z} or {x} (if x is raised to #2's top). In either case, we have
From L(X)
N \D to D: Suppose u ∈ D is constructed by raising an alternative from a profile q in L(X) N \D. So q can be constructed from u by lowering an alternative for someone. If y or t is lowered, it remains Pareto dominated and so not in G(q). If w is lowered, it becomes Pareto dominated and so not in G(q). If x or z is lowered and is chosen at G(q), then we have e.g.,
In each case, monotonicity is confirmed.
Note that G is anonymous (u * is obtained from u by a permutation on N ). A variant of G can be constructed that is also neutral. Given a permutation θ on X, let D θ be the collection of profiles obtained by applying θ to profiles in D. Set
Our next example modifies Example 8 by allowing n ≥ 3.
Example 9. Again we identify a subdomain D of L(X) N and set
N \D. We start from a list C of orderings on X = {x, y, z, w, t}: The first two orderings are the orderings in the profiles in D in Example 8. The next six orderings consist of the six possible ways of ordering {x, y, z, t} subject to x ≻ y and z ≻ t with w then appended at the bottom. Subdomain D consists of all profiles made up of these orderings subject to the condition that each of the first two orderings occurs exactly once. For any profile u ∈ D, we set G(u) = T (u) = {x, z}.
Clearly G satisfies the Pareto condition and tops-in. It is straightforward to check that balancedness and monotonicity hold.
Note that G is anonymous (because any permutation of N takes a profile in D to another profile in D). A variant of G can be constructed that is also neutral.
Finally, we illustrate the need for the restriction that each of the first two orderings occurs exactly once. Suppose n = 3 and consider the profiles u: 1 2 3 x z z y t t w w w z x x t y y and v: 1 2 3 x z z y t t w x w z w x t y y G(u) = {x, z} since u ∈ D; then v is obtained by raising x above w for #2. But G(v) = G P (v) = {x, z, w}, a violation of monotonicity.
Thus, to achieve a characterization of the Pareto correspondence for m ≥ 5, we need a new condition. We introduce a correspondence analog of a property of social choice functions which are resolute, i.e., single alternatives are chosen at every profile (Campbell, Kelly, and Qi, 2018) . A social choice function g satisfies stability if for every pair of profiles, u and u * , and for every pair x, y of alternatives, and every individual i, if x = g(u) and, in ordering u(i), alternative y is adjacent to and just below x, then if u * is obtained from u by only lowering x to just below y, we must have either g(u * ) = x or g(u * ) = y. A small change in the profile results in a restricted set of possible outcomes. Here, where we are dealing with correspondences, we consider the same alteration of profiles, but allow somewhat different consequences. A social choice correspondence G satisfies stability if for every pair of profiles, u and u * , and for every pair x, y of alternatives, and every individual i, if x ∈ G(u) and, in ordering u(i), alternative y is adjacent to and just below x, then if u * is obtained from u by only lowering x to just below y, we must have exactly one of the following outcomes hold at u * :
If G(u * ) differs from G(u), it must either drop x or add y, but not both.
The Pareto correspondence satisfies the stability property. Consider profile u with x ∈ G P (u), where y is just below x in u(i), and u * differs from u only in that x is brought down just below y in i's ordering. If z is any element of X\{x, y}, then z is dominated by an element at u * if and only if it is dominated by that same element at u. Hence z ∈ G P (u * ) if and only if z ∈ G P (u). So G P (u * ) can differ from G P (u) only by losing x or gaining y. But if y is gained, then y / ∈ G P (u). It must be that y was Pareto dominated by x at u. But then at u * , all individuals other than i still prefer x to y and so x is still Pareto optimal at u * , i.e., G P (u) can not both lose x and gain y. This means dictatorship fails stability.
Clearly G given by G(u) = X for all u satisfies stability. So does the following rule: Set G(u) = X unless, at u, there is a common alternative t at everyone's bottom rank; then set G(u) = X\{t}.
Many rules fail stability. G(u) = T (u), the Borda rule, and plurality rule fail stability. Also, the correspondences of Examples 8 and 9 do not satisfy stability. For example, in Example 8, consider profile u ∈ D:
1 2 x z y t w w z x t y where G(u) = {x, z}. Construct u * / ∈ D from u by bringing x down just below y for individual 1. G(u * ) = G P (u) = {x, y, z, w}, a violation of stability.
Stability also fails for plurality and T as seen at profile u:
Bringing x down just below a for #1 both loses x and gains a. Borda and Copeland also fail stability; consider profile u:
Bringing x down just below y for #1 both loses x and gains y.
We employ stability to complete a characterization of the Pareto correspondence with five or more alternatives. But before we present our next theorem, we show that monotonicity can be weakened considerably in the presence of stability. Recall that our monotonicity says that, starting from a profile u with x ∈ G(u), if v is constructed from u by (only) raising x in individual i's ordering, then
That is, x is still chosen but nothing new is chosen. But this second part can now be derived from stability. Let x be in i's jth rank at u, but at v has been raised to i's kth rank. Suppose G(v) ⊆ G(u) is false, i.e., there is a w ∈ G(v)\G(u). Now construct profile v * by lowering x one spot to rank k − 1. By stability, w ∈ G(v * ). Then lower x another rank and see w is again chosen. Continue in this fashion until you reach a contradiction with w / ∈ G(u).
Accordingly, we could relax monotonicity to just the following weak monotonicity:
Starting from a profile u with x ∈ G(u), if v is constructed from u by (only) raising x in individual i's ordering, then x ∈ G(v).
Inside the proof below, we use (full) monotonicity since it is implied by weak monotonicity and stability. Proof : Assume G satisfies the five conditions but G = G P . By the Pareto condition, no dominated alternative is ever chosen. So G = G P must be because some Pareto optimal alternative is not chosen. Consider the collection C of all profiles for which there exists at least one Pareto optimal alternative that is not chosen.
For each profile in C, let h(v), the height at v, be the highest rank of a Pareto optimal alternative not in G(v). Of all these heights of profiles in C, let h be the minimum (highest rank). Then let C ′ be the subcollection of all profile in C with height h. By tops-in, h > 1.
So for each profile v in C
′ there is at least one alternative w and an individual i such that 1. w is Pareto optimal at v; 2. w / ∈ G(v); 3. w is at rank h in v(i).
Note that for each such (v, w, i) , there is (by tops-in) at least one alternative, x, higher than w in v(i) such that x ∈ G(v). We call the gap for i at v the number of alternatives in v(i) between w and the closest alternative x above w such that x ∈ G(v). We are going to look for a profile u in C ′ , a Pareto optimal alternative w not in G(u), and individual i with w at rank h, such that the gap for i is a minimum.
Suppose we could find profile u, alternative x, and individual i for which the gap is 0, i.e., x ∈ G(u) is adjacent to and immediately above w. Without loss of generality take i = 1:
Since w is Pareto optimal, there is an individual, say #2, who ranks w above x.
is Pareto optimal but w / ∈ G(u), while x ∈ G(u). Construct u ′ from u by bringing x up just below w for #2. By monotonicity,
In particular, w / ∈ G(u ′ ). Now construct u * from u ′ by transposition pair (x, w) via #1 and #2. At u * , alternative w is still Pareto optimal and because G(u
, with w in rank h − 1, we have a contradiction of our choice of h.
What remains is to show that we can always find a profile u in C ′ with gap 0. We demonstrate this by showing how to construct, from a profile in C ′ with gap g > 0, a profile in C ′ with gap g − 1. Repeated application would yield a gap 0 profile.
So consider profile u in C ′ with gap g > 0. Suppose a / ∈ G(u) is just below x in u(i), between x and w and so u has gap g > 0. Assume further i = 1:
Construct u ′ from u by bringing x down just below a (adjacent to x) for #1. By stability, exactly one of the following holds:
In Cases 1 & 2, x is still chosen at u ′ and u ′ has gap g − 1, a contradiction.
So we need only examine Case 3. Since, at u ′ , alternative x is not chosen, it must not be Pareto optimal (because x is above rank h in u ′ (1)). But it was Pareto optimal at u (since it was chosen there). This can only happen if a dominates x at u ′ and so only if a is ranked higher than x at u for everyone other than #1. In particular, at u, someone, say #2, must rank w above a (because w is Pareto optimal) and then also ranks a above x. Construct u ′′ from u by bringing x up just below a in #2's ordering. Note w is still Pareto optimal. By monotonicity,
In particular, w / ∈ G(u ′′ ).
Finally, construct u * from u ′′ by transposition pair (x, a) via #1 and #2. Profile u * is still in C ′ , but u * has gap g − 1.
Regarding the need for each condition, Example 9 shows a rule other than G P satisfying all conditions of Theorem 4 except stability. A rule other than G P satisfying all conditions of Theorem 4 except Pareto is: G(u) = X for all profiles u. Finding such rules for the other three conditions is considerably harder.
Open questions:
1. Does there exist a correspondence G other than G P satisfying all of the conditions of Theorem 4 except tops-in? 2. Does there exist a correspondence G other than G P satisfying all of the conditions of Theorem 4 except balancedness?
3. Does there exist a correspondence G other than G P satisfying all of the conditions of Theorem 4 except weak monotonicity?
Final remarks
A perhaps unusual feature of the results in this paper is the use of the Pareto condition in characterizing the Pareto social choice correspondence. We make four observations:
1. What might appear to be an excessively strong condition is not sufficient for five or more alternatives even when supplemented with balancedness, monotonicity, tops-in, anonymity, and neutrality.
2. As noted earlier, the condition of excluding dominated alternatives is actually extremely weak and has been used in characterizing a wide variety of standard social choice correspondences: dictatorship, Borda, plurality voting, Copeland rule, and union of the tops.
3. It helps to compare with use of a plurality condition. Suppose we wanted to characterize plurality voting by using a plurality condition that excludes all alternatives that are not plurality winners and then added enough additional conditions to ensure that all plurality winners are included. This plurality condition would seem quite artificially constructed, solely for the purpose of the one characterization theorem. That's quite different from the Pareto condition. And almost all standard social choice correspondences fail the plurality condition.
4. Something like the Pareto condition is required. As seen by G(u) = X, all our other conditions combined, balancedness, monotonicity, and tops-in, plus anonymity, neutrality, and stability are insufficient to rule out correspondences which differ from G P . We can even get rules very far from G(u) = X, even very close to G P , but with just the occasional choice of a dominated alternative:
Example 10. Set G(u) = G P (u) except for those profiles with complete agreement: u(i) = u(j) (not just same top alternatives) for all i and j; at profiles of complete agreement, set G(u) to be the set consisting of everyone's top two alternatives (although the common second is Pareto-dominated). This also satisfies balancedness, monotonicity, and tops-in, plus anonymity, neutrality, and stability.
